(DOWNLOAD) "Dunlap v. Litshcer" by Seventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals # eBook PDF Kindle ePub Free
eBook details
- Title: Dunlap v. Litshcer
- Author : Seventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals
- Release Date : January 06, 2002
- Genre: Law,Books,Professional & Technical,
- Pages : * pages
- Size : 53 KB
Description
We have consolidated for decision three appeals from denial or dismissal of motions under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that present similar questions about the circumstances in which prisoners subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Acts amendments to the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. §Â§ 2241 et seq., and its substitute for federal prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, may file motions under Rule 60(b) to vacate a judgment denying habeas corpus. The rule allows a federal district court to relieve a party from a final judgment of the court on a variety of grounds, including "mistake," "fraud," and "newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial," and "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." The habeas corpus statute, however, without mentioning Rule 60(b), permits a second or subsequent application for relief only if the court of appeals certifies that the application is based either on a new rule of constitutional law made retroactively applicable by the Supreme Court to collateral challenges to final judgments or on newly discovered evidence that demonstrates that no reasonable finder of fact could have found the applicant guilty. 28 U.S.C. §Â§ 2244(b)(2), 2255 8. These provisions are clear and bar a district court from using Rule 60(b) to give a prisoner broader relief from a judgment rendered by the court in the prisoners federal habeas corpus (including section 2255) proceeding. Otherwise AEDPAs limitations on collateral attack would be set at naught. As we said recently, "Prisoners are not allowed to avoid the restrictions that Congress has placed on collateral attacks on their convictions or other custody-creating or -enhancing punishments by styling their collateral attacks as motions for reconsideration under Rule 60(b). There must be no circumvention of those restrictions by classifying a collateral attack as a Rule 60(b) motion." Harris v. Cotton, 296 F.3d 578, 579-80 (7th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). Many other cases in this and other courts agree. Johnson v. United States, 196 F.3d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 1999); Banks v. United States, 167 F.3d 1082, 1083-84 (7th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); Burris v. Parke, 130 F.3d 782, 783-84 (7th Cir. 1997); Lopez v. Douglas, 141 F.3d 974 (10th Cir. 1998) (per curiam); United States v. Rich, 141 F.3d 550, 551 (5th Cir. 1998); Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Felker v. Turpin, 101 F.3d 657, 660-61 (11th Cir. 1996); cf. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 553 (1998); McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302, 1335 (6th Cir. 1996); Hunt v. Nuth, 57 F.3d 1327, 1339 (4th Cir. 1995); Blair v. Armontrout, 976 F.2d 1130, 1134 (8th Cir. 1992). There is one outlier, Rodriguez v. Mitchell, 252 F.3d 191, 198-200 (2d Cir. 2001).